Critical infrastructure, convoy and ship: against which threat, and where
Dron Kalkanı was not designed for a single mission. The common denominator is closing the last 150 metres against a small, fast, cheap aerial threat. How that is done varies with the mission.
Where keeping watch is hardest
Protecting critical infrastructure is a problem of attention. The threat comes rarely, but when it comes it comes in seconds. Drone incursions at airports and military sites in Europe since 2025 have shown how exposed fixed sites are.
Energy and refineries
Generation, distribution and petrochemical plants.
Ports and terminals
Loading areas and storage yards.
Airport perimeters
Approach corridors and perimeter security.
Military sites
Barracks, depots and airfield protection.
Turrets are permanently installed at the site’s critical points and powered from its own supply. The engagement area, weapons-free sectors and no-fire zones are defined according to the site layout; in autonomous mode the system scans the sky without interruption.
Covering a target that is moving
Kamikaze and FPV drones attacking vehicles are the principal threat in convoy protection today. While a convoy is moving, setting up a jammer, deploying a radar or fielding upper-tier air defence is usually not possible. The turret moves with the vehicle and works independently.
Multiple and swarm attacks
Magazine capacity makes it possible to engage several drones arriving in sequence or as a swarm. Work at this stage focuses on perfecting performance against single-drone attacks; work on multiple-drone scenarios is ongoing.
Commercial fleets have no air defence
Attacks by unmanned aerial and surface vehicles on commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Black Sea have brought the need for close-in protection of bulk carriers and tankers into focus. Unlike naval vessels, commercial fleets carry no air defence system.
You cannot put a gun or a missile system on the deck of a bulk carrier; neither the cost nor the regulation allows it. For a shipowner this means portable protection while transiting risky waters.
- Runs on the ship’s own electricity
- Fixes to the deck and can be removed after the voyage
- Requires no qualified weapons personnel
- Portable protection for the duration of a risky transit
Complementary, not competing
Dron Kalkanı was not designed to replace an existing air defence architecture. Its purpose is to close the gap at the bottom of it: the last 150 metres a drone crosses after getting past the upper layers.
Standalone layer
It works with its own sensors; the existing architecture is left untouched.
Networked cueing
Networked target data slews the turret; the engagement begins when its own sensors acquire the target.
Defeat only
Another sensor detects and tracks; Dron Kalkanı delivers the engagement.
Jammers are effective against most drones and expend no ammunition, but they are ineffective against fibre-optic or autonomously routed drones. Dron Kalkanı assumes the two do not exclude each other: the jammer does what it can, and Dron Kalkanı physically resolves what it cannot.
What threat are you positioning against?
Share your mission profile and our team will assess platform fit, integration and engagement conditions.